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COMMENTARY
THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF FINDING WELFARE RIGHTS
IN THE CONSTITUTION
ROBERT H. BORK*
There is a certain difficulty today--one, I think, of communication.
Professor Michelman and I tend to operate in different universes of
constitutional discourse. His universe is somewhat more abstract and
philosophical than mine, and considerably more egalitarian, in keeping
with the Zeitgeist. I would claim, although I think Professor
Michelman would deny it, that the argument for welfare rights is un-
connected with either the Constitution or its history. The welfare-
rights theory, therefore, offers inadequate guidelines and so requires
political decisionmaking by the judiciary. If that is not true-if there
are criteria other than social and political sympathies-I certainly do
not see the legal sources from which Professor Michelman's form of
constitutional argumentation arises.
I represent that school of thought which insists that the judiciary in-
validate the work of the political branches only in accordance with an
inference whose underlying premise is fairly discoverable in the Consti-
tution itself. That leaves room, of course, not only for textual analysis,
but also for historical discourse and interpretation according to the
Constitution's structure and function. The latter approach is the judi-
cial method of McCulloch v. Maryland,I for example, and it has been
well analyzed by my colleague Professor Charles Black in his book,
Structure and Relationshp in Constitutional Law.2
Given these limits to what I conceive to be the proper method of
constitutional interpretation, it is not surprising that I disagree with the
thesis that welfare rights derive in any sense from the Constitution or
that courts may legitimately place them there. The effect of Professor
Michelman's style of argument, which has quite a number of devotees
on the faculties of both Yale and Harvard, is to create rights by argu-
* Alexander M. Bickel Professor of Public Law, Yale University. B.A., 1948, J.D., 1953,
University of Chicago.
1. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
2. C. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTION LAW (1969).
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ments from moral philosophy rather than from constitutional text, his-
tory, and structure. The end result would be to convert our
government from one by representative assembly to one by judiciary.
That result seems to me unfortunate for a variety of reasons.
The impossibility of the enterprise is but one reason that this devel-
opment is unfortunate. There is a certain seductiveness to the notion of
judges gathered in conference and engaged in the sort of subtle philo-
sophical analysis advanced by Professor Michelman. But the hard
truth is that this kind of reasoning is impossible for committees. The
violent disagreements among the legal philosophers alone demonstrate
that there is no single path down which philosophical reasoning must
lead. On arguments of this type, one can demonstrate that the obliga-
tion to pay for welfare is a violation of a right as easily as that there is a
constitutional right to receive welfare. Under these impossible circum-
stances, courts-perhaps philosophers, also-will reason toward con-
clusions that appeal to them for reasons other than those expressed.
Judicial government, at best, will be government according to the pre-
vailing intellectual fashion and, perhaps, government according to
quite idiosyncratic political and social views.
The consequence of this philosophical approach to constitutional law
almost certainly would be the destruction of the idea of law. Once
freed of text, history, and structure, this mode of argument can reach
any result. Conventional modes of interpretation do not give precise
results, but if honestly applied, they narrow the range of permissible
results to a much greater extent than do arguments from moral philoso-
phy. What is at stake, therefore, in "The Quest for Equality" through
the judiciary is the answer to the question of who governs. A tradi-
tional court must leave open a wide range for democratic processes; a
philosophical court in the new manner need not.
Professor Michelman has chosen to rest his argument in part upon
the ongoing work of Professor John Ely.' The premise of their joint
argument, as I understand it, is that interpretation of the Constitution
cannot be confined to an "interpretivist" approach, which I and
others suggest, because particular constitutional provisions-the ninth
amendment and the privileges-or-immunities clause among them-
3. See Ely, The Supreme Court, 1977 Term-Foreword On Discovering Fundamental Val-
ues, 92 HARv. L. REv. 5 (1978); Ely, Constitutional Interpretivism: Its A/lure and IFossibilitv, 53
IND. L.J. 399 (1978); Ely, Towarda Representation-Reinforeing Mode ofJudicialReview, 37 MD. L.
REv. 451 (1978).
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command judges to look beyond conventional sources and to create
new rights. That argument seems unpersuasive for a number of rea-
sons.
In the first place, not even a scintilla of evidence supports the argu-
ment that the framers and the ratifiers of the various amendments in-
tended the judiciary to develop new individual rights, which
correspondingly create new disabilities for democratic government.
Although we do not know precisely what the phrase "privileges or im-
munities" meant to the framers, a variety of explanations exist for its
open-endedness other than that the framers intended to delegate to
courts the power to make up the privileges or immunities in the clause.
The obvious possibility, of course, is that the people who framed the
privileges-or-immunities clause did have an idea of what they meant,
but that their idea has been irretrievably lost in the mists of history. If
that is true, it is hardly a ground for judicial extrapolation from the
clause.
Perhaps a more likely explanation is that the framers and ratifiers
themselves were not certain of their intentions. Although the judiciary
must give content to vague phrases, it need not go well beyond what the
framers and ratifiers reasonably could be supposed to have had in
mind. If the framers really intended to delegate to judges the function
of creating new rights by the method of moral philosophy, one would
expect that they would have said so. They could have resolved their
uncertainty by writing a ninth amendment that declared: "The
Supreme Court shall, from time to time, find and enforce such addi-
tional rights as may be determined by moral philosophy, or by consid-
eration of the dominant ideas of republican government." But if that
was what they really intended, they were remarkably adroit in manag-
ing not to say so.
It should give theorists of the open-ended Constitution pause, more-
over, that not even the most activist courts have ever grounded their
claims for legitimacy in arguments along those lines. Courts closest in
time to the adoption of the Constitution and various amendments, who
might have been expected to know what powers had been delegated to
them, never offered argument along the lines advanced by Professor
Michelman. The Supreme Court, in fact, has been attacked repeatedly
throughout its history for exceeding its delegated powers; yet this line
of defense seems never to have occurred to its members. For these rea-
Number 3]
Washington University Open Scholarship
698 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
sons I remain unpersuaded that the interpretivist argument can be
escaped.
For purposes of further discussion, however, let us assume that the
interpretivist argument has been escaped; that the Court may read
new rights into the Constitution. Even so, the welfare-rights thesis is a
long way from home. Professor Michelman, so far as I can tell, rests
the argument for his thesis on two bases: first, on a cluster of Supreme
Court decisions; and second, on Professor Ely's discovery of a trans-
cedent value in the Constitution that vests courts with the power and
function called "representation-reinforcement." I think neither argu-
ment supports the theory.
The most obvious problem with Professor Michelman's argument
from case law is one that he recognizes. The cases, as he admits, are
confusing and internally contradictory. This absence of a clear pattern
is less suggestive of an emerging constitutional right to basic needs than
it is of a politically divided Court that has wandered so far from consti-
tutional moorings that some of its members are engaging in free votes.
Moreover, even if a right to basic needs clearly emerged from the cases,
the question would remain whether these decisions were constitution-
ally legitimate.
That question brings us to Professor Michelman's basic argument for
the legitimacy of representation-reinforcement-the idea that people
will have better access to the political process if their basic needs are
met. This argument raises at least two problems: one concerns justifi-
cation of representation-reinforcement as a value that courts are enti-
tled to press beyond that representation provided by the written
Constitution and statutes; the other relates to the factual accuracy of
the assertion that persons at the lower end of the economic spectrum
need assistance to be represented adequately.
It would not do to derive the legitimacy of representation-reinforce-
ment from such materials as, for example, the one-man-one-vote cases
because those cases themselves require justification and cannot be
taken to support the principle advanced to support them. Nor would it
do to rest the concept of representation-reinforcement on the American
history of steadily expanding suffrage. That expansion was accom-
plished politically, and the existence of a political trend cannot of itself
give the Court a warrant to carry the trend beyond its own limits. How
far the people decide not to go is as important as how far they do go.
The idea of representation-reinforcement, therefore, is internally
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contradictory. As a concept it tends to devour itself. It calls upon the
judiciary to deny representation to those who have voted in a particular
way to enhance the representation of others. Thus, what is reinforced
is less democratic representation than judicial power and the trend to-
ward redistribution of goods. If I were looking at the Constitution for a
suffusing principle that judges were entitled to enforce even though it
was not explicitly stated, that principle would be the separation of pow-
ers or the limited political authority of courts. That principle, of
course, would run the argument in a direction opposite to Professor
Michelman's. In truth, the notion of a representation-reinforcement
finds no support as a constitutional value beyond those guarantees
written into the document.
Let us pass over that hurdle, however, to ask what kind of a function
the courts would perform to reinforce representation. The effort to ap-
ply that value would completely transform the nature and role of
courts. Aside from the enforcement problem that limits application of
the value, a theoretical problem plagues the theory. Professor
Michelman apparently concludes that a claimant cannot go into a court
and demand a welfare program as a constitutional right, but if a wel-
fare program already exists, he can demand that it be broadened. The
right to broadening rests upon the premise that there is a basic right to
the program. If so, why cannot the Court order a program to start up
from scratch? In part it seems to be a remedial problem-how to order
the United States Congress, for example, to establish a medical health
insurance program-but that is not entirely convincing. If a constitu-
tional right is at stake, why should the Court not issue a declaratory
judgment, at least to exert a hortatory effect upon the legislature? A
constitutional lawyer with the boldness to suggest a constitutional right
to welfare ought not to shy at remedial difficulties.
It might be useful to consider what a court would have to decide in a
constitutional claim to a welfare right. Suppose a claimant represented
by Professor Michelman came to the Supreme Court, alleged that the
state of X had just repealed its welfare statutes, and asked for an au-
thoritative judgment that he and all similarly situated persons are enti-
tled to welfare so that they could better participate in the political
process. Because they would not have to devote all their energies to
making a living, they not only would have a better opportunity for par-
ticipation in the political process, but also would not be stigmatized as
a poor and powerless group. The Justices might find this plausible.
Number 3]
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Suppose, however, that the attorney general for the state of X then
stands up and argues that the state, in repealing the welfare laws, acted
precisely for the purpose of reinforcing representation. The legislature
had at last become convinced that welfare payments tend to relegate
entire groups to a condition of permanent dependency so that they are
not the active and independent political agents that they ought to be;
moreover, these groups had lost political influence because they had
been stigmatized as people on welfare. Experience had convinced the
legislature that it would be better for people of that class, and for their
participation in the political process, to struggle without state support
as other poor groups have done successfully in our history.
What is the Court to do when faced with two arguments of this sort,
neither of them obviously true or untrue? Is the Court to make a socio-
logical estimate of which actions will, in fact, reinforce representation
in society? And what of the possibility that payment of welfare benefits
today may reinforce representation, but ten or twenty years from now
welfare payments will have the opposite effect? In a judicial context,
the problem is hopeless. Courts simply are not equipped, much less
authorized, to make such decisions. There are almost no limits to
where this concept of representation-reinforcement will lead the courts.
If, for example, the concept of representation-reinforcement justifies
the demand for welfare, why might it not also justify judicial invalida-
tion of the minimum wage and the collective bargaining laws? Counsel
could show theoretically and empirically that those laws create unem-
ployment, that they do so primarily among the poor and disproportion-
ately among the young black population, and that unemployment
harms these groups' capacity to participate in the political process.
Representation-reinforcement could take us back to Lochner.4
You may view this as ribaldry if you wish, but if the Harvard theo-
rists succeed in establishing representation-reinforcement as a constitu-
tional right, we ought to consider suing the United States for an
increase in defense expenditures, because the Soviets clearly intend
domination, and if they succeed, our representation, among other
things, will be drastically curtailed. It is preposterous that the Supreme
Courts should control the defense budget to reinforce or safeguard ac-
cess to a democratic political process, but not much more preposterous
4. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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than the suggestion that the Court control the nondefense budget to the
same end.
There are any number of difficulties with the welfare-rights theory.
For instance, why should the Court or any other nondemocratic body
define basic needs? A welfare recipient might tell the Court that he
would be better able to participate in the democratic process if the gov-
ernment provided him with something better than the existing package
of public housing, food stamps, and health insurance; that he would
feel more dignified or would be less stigmatized if he looked like every-
body else; ie., had disposable income. The solution is a negative in-
come tax. How could the Court legitimately tell the claimant either
that he is wrong about himself or that, if he is right, he still has no case?
I will conclude with a consideration that is increasingly beneath the
notice of the abstract, philosophical style of argument: the factual
premises of this constitutional position seem deficient. The premise
that the poor or the black are underrepresented politically is quite du-
bious. In the past two decades we have witnessed an explosion of wel-
fare legislation, massive income redistributions, and civil rights laws of
all kinds. The poor and the minorities have had access to the political
process and have done very well through it. In addition to its other
defects, then, the welfare-rights theory rests less on demonstrated fact
than on a liberal shibboleth.
Perhaps we should be discussing not "The Quest for Equality," but
the question of how much equality in what areas of life is desirable.
Equality is not the only value in society; we must balance degrees of it
against other values. That balance is preeminently a matter for the po-
litical process, not for the courts.
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